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3 David Minear Master’s Thesis 
Having your cake and eating it too 
An English proverb states that ‘you cannot have your cake and eat it (too)’.1 This idiom encapsulates 
the view of the majority of scholars2 on the topic of self-ownership and equality. These two 
philosophical ideals are generally judged to be at logger-heads, mutually excluding each other. This 
conflict is essentially between equality of rights, and equality of condition (Raz, 2009). Whilst self-
ownership focuses on individual liberty, equality of situation requires an interference with the rights 
of individuals. Right Libertarians generally view equality as an unwanted and un-needed pattern. 
Conversely, liberal egalitarians such as Dworkin have rejected self-ownership as ‘vague’ (Dworkin, 
1981). Left-libertarians however (with varying degrees of success) have undertaken the task of 
reconciling these two ideas. This thesis will focus upon the work of four philosophers: Robert Nozick, 
G.A Cohen, Michael Otsuka, and Peter Vallentyne. The first two of these writers represent the 
fundamental basis for left-libertarianism, whilst the second two offer contrasting approaches for 
solving the problems identified by the former. 
The works that formed the inspiration for the left-libertarian reconciliation of self-ownership and 
equality will be set out. This was both as a reaction against Robert Nozick, and a development upon 
G.A Cohen’s arguments within Self-ownership, Freedom and Equality. The first section of this thesis is 
therefore dedicated to setting out (somewhat briefly) each of their views of Self-ownership and 
equality. Though, as will be made clear, while the pair differed on most issues, Cohen and Nozick 
agreed that a reconciliation of the two ideas was not readily attainable. The left-libertarian project 
was largely developed from Cohen, as questions and ideas raised opened up new areas of 
investigation.3 This thesis will set out options as to how self-ownership and equality can be 
                                                          
1
 This essentially means that you must choose between two mutually exclusive possible options:  that of 
keeping the cake, and that of eating the cake. 
2
Right Libertarians (Nozick, Mack, Narveson) reject a reconciliation of self-ownership and equality, as do 
egalitarians (Rawls and Dworkin). Each side views the ideal that they prize too important to be limited by the 
other.  
3
 To name but one example, Cohen’s idea of ‘effective autonomy’ which provided the foundation for Otsuka’s 
‘robust’ self-ownership  
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effectively brought together, without either being ‘diluted’ or rendered ‘meaningless’ as Fried 
suggests (Fried, 2004). The question then arises as to which of the plethora of potential left-
libertarian options are most viable.  
This thesis will focus upon two such attempts to reconcile self-ownership and equality: that of Peter 
Vallentyne, and that of Michael Otsuka. Although both authors view themselves as ‘equal 
opportunity for welfare left-libertarians’, there are nonetheless clear and significant difference 
between their conceptions of both self-ownership and equality. Contrasting these 2 divergent 
interpretations of self-ownership and equality will illustrate clearly which approach is more 
successful. This approach will therefore allow me to assess: Does left-libertarianism’s, and in 
particular Michael Otsuka’s and Peter Vallentyne’s, reconciliation of self-ownership and equality 
offer a more convincing libertarian alternative to Robert Nozick’s rebuttal of such a union in Anarchy, 
State and Utopia?  
This thesis will argue that Michael Otsuka’s reconciliation of self-ownership and equality represents 
the strongest left-libertarian case. More than this though, I will suggest that Otsuka’s welfarist 
egalitarian approach is largely successful at reconciling what many have deemed irreconcilable. 
Vallentyne’s approach on the other hand will be shown to have significant drawbacks. First, each 
authors definition of ‘self-ownership’ will be assessed and contrasted. Secondly, their approaches to 
redefining the Lockean proviso and initial acquisition of resources will be examined. Finally, the 
attempt that each has made to reconcile these two concepts together will be examined. The strength 
of Otsuka’s approach will be highlighted by its contrast to the problems that exist within Vallentyne’s 
attempt to bring self-ownership and equality together.   
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1 Robert Nozick on self-ownership and equality  
Anarchy, the State and Utopia4 (1974) is widely considered to be Robert Nozick’s magnum opus 
(citation). It is nonetheless important to understand that Nozick is not a ‘paradigmatic right-
Libertarian’, since his proviso is deemed overly restrictive upon individuals rights (Risse, 2004, p. 340). 
I will focus upon the second part of the book: Beyond the minimal state? (Nozick, 1974, pp. 149-292) . 
Here Nozick rejects the idea that there can legitimately be a ‘more than minimal state’, and defends 
a Lockean account of self-ownership.5 The need to justify the legitimacy of authority is a consistent 
theme throughout the entire book. Throughout ASU Nozick talks regularly of ‘justifiability, 
permissibility, and legitimacy’, the main focus of the book is clearly justice (Vallentyne, 2011, p. 90) 
That said, the word ‘self-ownership’ is only used once within ASU, and that is in the context of the 
‘classical liberals notion of self-ownership’ (Nozick, 1974, p. 172). Whilst self-ownership has been 
readily identified as the core of Nozick’s work6, its near complete absence within the text has 
inevitably led to diverging opinions as to the exact nature of Nozick’s ‘self-ownership’.  
1.1 Entitlement Theory 
For Nozick ‘entitlement, not desert nor need should be decisive’ in distributing property (Wolff, 1991, 
p. 9). Your rights to worldly things are as inviolable and comprehensive as your right to your two eyes 
(Wolff, 1991, p. 9). The ‘entitlement theory’ sets out Nozick’s rules for justice in holdings, and 
therefore his conception of justice: 
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is 
entitled to that holding 
                                                          
4
 Anarchy, the State and Utopia will henceforth be referred to under the acronym ‘ASU’ 
5
 This is not without contention  
6
 See G.A. Cohen , Self-ownership, Freedom and Equality, p1-18 
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2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from 
someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding 
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) application of 1 and 2 (Nozick, 1974, p. 
151)  
This sets out how any person may justly attain rights over any property. Justice in acquisition (1) sets 
out the legitimate ways that previously unowned resources ‘may come to be held’ (Nozick, 1974, p. 
150). The second part of Nozick’s justice in holdings is that of justice in transfer (Nozick, 1974, p. 152).  
Here Nozick states that any person may justly hold property by transfer, so long as they have 
received it from someone who themselves acquired it legitimately. For Nozick: A distribution is just if 
it arises from another just distribution by legitimate means (Nozick, 1974, p. 151). So long as each 
individual is entitled to the land that they hold, that the distribution is just (Nozick, 1974, p. 151).  
To safeguard against any potential injustices within the system, the third principle is one of 
rectification.  Impermissible modes of transfer are required to be rectified. However in terms of 
practicality Nozick himself is unsure exactly how far back one should go to rectify the ‘slate of 
injustices’ (Nozick, 1974, p. 151).  
1.2 Self-ownership 
Nozick’s self-ownership utilises Kant’s formula of humanity from the groundwork. It can never be 
justified to force any individual actor into assisting another member of society, as this would entail 
treating him as a ‘means’ rather than an ‘end’ in himself. No-one may be compelled to do anything 
that might reduce their own quality of life, regardless of the potential benefits to others. Taxation for 
the purposes of redistribution thus qualifies as ‘forced labour’ and is therefore morally indefensible 
(Wolff, 1991, p. 11).  
This independence is to the extent that individuals can justly reduce the capabilities of others. Nozick 
uses an example of a world with 26 people (a-z). Each appropriates resources in turn. By the time 
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that Y has appropriated resources, there are insufficient resources left for Z to sustain himself. This 
distribution of resources does not apparently impede Z’s rights of self-ownership. So long as each of 
the others attained their resources justly, then the ensuing distribution is just. Self-ownership is 
therefore supposedly unaffected by a lack of property or resources.  
Justification for intervention in the life of an individual comes when someone directly intervenes with 
him or his property: the ‘Incursion model’ (Otsuka, 1998b, p. 153). Self-ownership is therefore only 
restricted when one’s property or person are physically restricted. The absence of property therefore, 
and the need to work for someone who owns resources is not a restriction of self-ownership within 
this definition. Nozick focuses on direct actions against property rights, rather than indirect action by 
others that will have an inevitable consequence on an individual.  
1.3 Lockean Proviso 
Eric Mack points out that the Lockean Proviso is more of an after-thought on the part of Nozick 
(Mack, 2009); it is a way of getting around the problems faced by radical right libertarians such as 
Murray Rothbard. Nozick’s theory of justice works within a version of the ‘Lockean Proviso’ found 
within John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government. Nozick adopts ‘enough and as good left for 
others’ as the fundamental element of his own Lockean proviso. The world is assumed to be initially 
unowned, with no property claims. From this start-point, the Lockean proviso acts as a restriction 
upon the extent to which property may be appropriated justly. Nozick’s interpretation of this proviso 
works on the basis that others cannot be made worse off by appropriation. Thus one cannot 
‘appropriate the only watering hole in a desert and charge what he will’ (Nozick, 1974, p. 180).  
Nozick only views the proviso as being applicable where ‘the position of others no longer at liberty to 
use the thing is thereby worsened’ (Nozick, 1974, p. 178). Certain aspects are not covered within his 
proviso. For example, worsening opportunities for others to appropriate resources is not a justifiable 
reason (Nozick, 1974, p. 178).  
8 David Minear Master’s Thesis 
1.4 Patterns 
Nozick believes that equality undermines self-ownership. Liberty upsets patterns and so patterns 
should be rejected. Nozick’s view of patterns can be simplified thus: 
1) liberty upsets patterns 
2) equality requires patterns 
3) ∴ liberty and equality are incompatible 
4) equality is essential 
5) ∴ patterns should be disregarded in favour of liberty 
(1) In order to maintain equality within any society, ‘one must either continually interfere to stop 
people from transferring resources as they wish to, or continually interfere to take from some 
persons resources that others for some reason chose to transfer to them’ (Nozick, 1974, p. 160). 
Here Nozick invokes his famous Wilt Chamberlain example.7 He questions whether this new 
distribution of resources could be unjust, given that all participating parties acted freely. Each actor 
has the power to use their resources however they saw fit, and the new distribution arises from a 
previously just distribution by just means. Equality would not permit such accumulation of wealth on 
the part of Wilt Chamberlain, even though it is just. (2) For the pattern of equality to be maintained 
Wilt’s resources need to be continually interfered with and redistributed to others. A distributional 
pattern with ‘any egalitarian component is overturnable by the voluntary actions of individual 
persons over time’ (Nozick, 1974, p. 164).  (3) The Wilt Chamberlain example makes it clear that 
equality is incompatible with self-ownership, and (4) Nozick, as a libertarian, believes that self-
ownership is essential. (5) This therefore leads to the logical conclusion that equality must be 
rejected (Nozick, 1974). All forms of distributive justice that require patterns must likewise be 
rejected. 
                                                          
7
 In a proposed socialist egalitarian society with an equal distribution of resources, each individual then has the 
opportunity to pay 25 cents to watch Wilt Chamberlain play basketball.  If during a season 1 million people pay 
to Watch Wilt play, then he will have made $250,000. The total distribution of resources will therefore now be 
distinctly unequal, with Wilt possessing much more than the average person.  
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1.5 Value of Nozick 
Robert Nozick put together a strong defense of self-ownership and rejection of egalitarianism. The 
entitlement theory is largely a response to Rawls’ difference principle and principles of justice. He 
comprehensively rejects the egalitarianism prevalent within A Theory of Justice in favour of self-
ownership. Thomas Nagel argued that ASU was without foundations, since Nozick simply assumes 
that people have extensive rights against any coercive interference (Feser, 2014). This thesis will not 
address the validity of this critique.  Even if this were to be accepted as correct, a new argument does 
not necessarily need to be generally accepted as correct in order to be of value.  It can, as I will argue 
is the case with ASU, be often erroneous, but be thought provoking, and opens up philosophically 
interesting areas, just as Descartes’ meditations did (Feser, 2014).  The reaction that ASU provoked 
from the likes of Cohen and left-libertarians illustrates its value to philosophical thought, even if it 
were deemed ‘baseless’.  
2 G.A. Cohen’s critique of Nozick 
G.A Cohen’s Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality8 constituted an assault upon Nozick’s conception 
of self-ownership within ASU (Cohen, 1995). In contrast to writers such as Kant who view self-
ownership as incoherent, and Dworkin who views it as overly vague, Cohen accepts the strength of 
the argument (Cohen, 1995, p. 17). For Cohen, a full self-owner ‘possesses over himself, as a matter 
of moral right, all those rights that a slaveholder has over a complete chattel slave as a matter of 
legal right’ (Cohen, 1995, p. 68). Cohen challenged several of Nozick’s arguments, but for him this 
represented only a weakening of the self-ownership thesis, which could not be entirely refuted 
(Cohen, 1995). This proves a problem for Marxists, who, in their desire for material equality would be 
best served by a straight rejection of the self-ownership thesis. More than this though, Cohen makes 
it clear that a key element of Marxist critique of capitalism is based upon the self-ownership 
                                                          
8
 Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality will henceforth be referred to as ‘SFE’ 
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principle9.  The genius of Cohen’s work is seemingly more in its critique, than in offering any 
alternative workable conception (Chodos, 2009).  
Cohen approaches the self-ownership and equality debate from a very different viewpoint than 
Nozick. An ‘analytical Marxist’, for Cohen ‘socialism was superior to capitalism from any morally 
decent point of view’ (Cohen, 1995).  Jan Narveson suggests that Cohen simply assumes the value of 
equality, without providing a proper defence (Narveson, 1997, p. 2)10.  Such criticisms somewhat miss 
the point of SFE. Cohen does not attempt a defense of equality that has been so strongly defended 
by others, and to take this defense as a starting point for assessing self-ownership is not a sign of 
weakness. Much like Cohen in SFE, this thesis will assume that there is value in equality. This debate 
cannot however be addressed in detail. Whilst setting out Cohen’s complex arguments fully would be 
an impossible task within this essay, his main refutations of Nozickian self-ownership theory, and its 
implications for the reconciliation of self-ownership and equality will be detailed below. Although 
Cohen is unable to formulate a workable link between the two concepts, he differs from Nozick in 
that he does believe it to be possible (and beneficial!). 
2.1 Effective Autonomy 
A major criticism of Nozick within SFE is in Cohen’s explanation of how the self-ownership thesis fails 
to work effectively with regard to autonomy. Although Nozick regards his self-ownership as ‘full’, this 
is shown to be often at the expense of ‘effective autonomy’ (Cohen, 1995). As mentioned previously, 
Nozick utilizes an analogy where ‘z’ is left without any capacity to appropriate resources. If ‘z’ is 
unable to attain the necessary resources to survive, or is forced to work for another, then his 
autonomy is restricted. His freedom and liberty to act is restricted to the extent that his ‘full’ self-
ownership is somewhat meaningless.  Cohen therefore poses the challenge that either self-
                                                          
9
 The capitalist exploitation of workers centres upon the removal of the personal property of the workers by 
capitalists. Self-ownership, and the idea that adding value to a product through labour grants ownership must 
therefore be embedded within Marxist philosophy.  
10
 Raz (2009) goes further to suggest that no egalitarians have offered a satisfactory explanation of the intrinsic 
value of equality 
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ownership within ASU is simply formal, or ‘capitalism does not preserve complete self-ownership, 
since the worst-off’s self-ownership is not robust enough to qualify as such’ (Cohen, 1995, p. 278). 
Joint-ownership could offer an alternative to Nozick’s ‘first claimant’ approach to initial appropriation, 
as self-ownership does not necessarily say anything about resource allocation. Joint ownership of 
resources would allow each person to still be a full self-owner. However, Cohen also notes that the 
clear critique of this approach is that it renders self-ownership ‘merely formal’ (Cohen, 1995). Such 
an attack cannot be undertaken by Nozickians, who suffer from the same critique.  As such, Nozick’s 
idea that equality and self-ownership cannot be reconciled within his framework must be considered 
erroneous. The point of the joint ownership argument is that either self-ownership is either merely 
formal, or it is compatible with equality of condition.   
2.2 Slavery 
A second claim that Cohen refutes is that a rejection of self-ownership induces slavery. For Nozick, a 
loss of self-ownership would mean that such things as a compulsory eye redistribution could occur. 
Allegedly, pure equality would stress that each individual deserves to have at least one working eye. 
Therefore in a consequentialist egalitarian system eyes could be removed from individuals and 
redistributed to those without working eyes. Cohen however makes clear that there are other 
reasons, other than that of self-ownership that would prevent such a redistribution of eyeballs 
(Cohen, 1995). This therefore counters the idea that self-ownership is the only thing protecting 
individuals’ rights to their bodies. Cohen also confronts Nozick’s claim of how taxation of income 
constitutes ‘forced labour’ (Cohen, 1995).Though he accepts taxation to be troubling for self-
ownership, he argues that it does not represent so great a violation of rights as to represent ‘forced 
labour’.  A brief comparison between an individual forced to pay tax on income, and a chattel slave is 
enough to see that Nozick shows the exaggeration in terms of the ranges of choices and liberty 
available.  Furthermore, Cohen contends that Nozick’s problem with taxation of income is one of 
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property rights violations, rather than of ‘forced labour’. Taxation breaching property rights is 
somewhat undesirable, but does not constitute slavery or ‘forced labour’.  
2.3 Failures at bringing the two concepts together 
Though weakening the self-ownership doctrine, Cohen nonetheless argues that bringing equality and 
self-ownership together is not yet achievable (Cohen, 1995). He argues that an egalitarian proviso 
cannot be reconciled with self-ownership. 
‘No egalitarian rule  regarding external resources alone will, together with self-ownership, 
deliver equality of outcome, except, as in the case of joint ownership, at an unacceptable 
sacrifice of autonomy’ (Cohen, 1995, p. 15) 
 
He accepts that there is an intrinsic value in self-ownership, that cannot be readily ignored. Though 
not impossible, the task of bringing equality and self-ownership together is a considerable but 
necessary challenge, as Nozick’s self-ownership thesis fundamentally confronts egalitarianism. It 
cannot be ignored, and must somehow be overcome. Cohen’s analysis of ASU opens up further areas 
of investigation, and acts as a catalyst for the future left-libertarian attempts to unite self-ownership 
and equality within a single theory of justice. He highlights problems and dilemmas within self-
ownership, and Marxism that others will need to overcome. If not overcome, then the resulting Left-
Libertarian outcomes are likely to struggle with the same problems as Nozick. In the same vein, 
Cohen’s labours highlight potential ways that elements of self-ownership can be made more 
amenable to equality. SFE therefore acts to guide those seeking to bring equality and self-ownership 
together, offering potential solutions, as well as highlighting problems. Cohen’s evaluation of Nozick 
will be particularly useful in assessing the relative merits of Otsuka and Vallentyne’s Left-Libertarian 
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theories. Whilst Otsuka broadly works within Cohen’s guidelines, Vallentyne does not, and the 
consequence is a significantly weaker attempt at reconciling self-ownership and equality. 
3 Uniting equality and self-ownership: Otsuka and Vallentyne  
The previous section highlighted the problems with Robert Nozick’s conception of self-ownership and 
equality. The theories of two Left-Libertarian theorists will now be assessed in order to judge which, 
if either, of them can offer a better understanding of the relationship between self-ownership and 
equality. The two versions that I shall contrast are that of Peter Vallentyne and Michael Otsuka. 
These are selected as they both take an approach of ‘equal opportunity for welfare Left-Libertarians’, 
which I believe to be the most promising version of left-libertarianism. However, this does not mean 
that there are not significant differences between them. Put simply, Vallentyne follows a broadly 
Georgist approach (Fischer, 2014).  Henry George (1879) argued for regular rent payments on 
appropriated land that would initially begin unowned. The following sections will show how 
Vallentyne’s left-libertarianism struggles in comparison to Otsuka’s. These two diverging approaches 
will be assessed in their approach to several key areas: Self-ownership, world-ownership, the 
Lockean proviso, taxation, and redistribution. Otsuka’s left-libertarianism will be shown to offer both 
a more genuine form of self-ownership and greater equality. 
Before dissecting the differences between Otsuka and Vallentyne’s arguments It is important to 
understand that they are in many ways very similar. Both argue against Nozick and in favour of 
greater equality. Similarly, each agrees that some form of taxation is needed.  That which is taxed 
should then be redistributed to allow for an equal opportunity for welfare.  Michael Otsuka’s 
comments regarding the joint effort of himself, Hillel Steiner, and Peter Vallentyne to defend left-
libertarianism (Steiner, et al., 2005) nonetheless makes clear that their differences are significant: 
‘We discovered during this period that our mutual commitment to this version of liberal 
egalitarianism was more an overlapping consensus than a shared comprehensive doctrine. 
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Our normative and conceptual disagreements were striking, and it was only after persistent 
efforts to persuade one another to our respective points of view and some artful papering 
over the remaining differences that we were able to publish a piece to which the three of us 
could sign our names’ (Otsuka, 2009b, p. 132) 
The ‘striking’ normative and conceptual disagreements between himself and Peter Vallentyne will 
now be set out. 
4 Self-Ownership  
The first contrast that will be illustrated between Peter Vallentyne and Michael Otsuka is in their 
respective definitions of self-ownership. These definitions form the basis for the subsequent 
attempts to reconcile self-ownership with equality. The next two sections will set out the contrasting 
definitions, and illustrate the superiority of the Otsukian argument.  
4.1 Vallentyne’s  self-ownership 
Peter Vallentyne’s theory of self-ownership has been expanded upon and alluded to in a wide range 
of his works.  Vallentyne essentially defends much of the Nozickian ideas on self-ownership, and 
supports ‘full’ self-ownership. Whilst he accepts the importance of Cohen’s (1995) critique of the 
self-ownership thesis, he nonetheless believes it can be overcome to allow for a version of ‘full’ self-
ownership to be unified with equality.  
Vallentyne accepts many of Cohen’s criticisms of full self-ownership in SFE (Vallentyne, 1998). He sets 
out in depth three of Cohen’s key criticisms, none of which he makes any significant inroads into 
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refuting. However what Vallentyne does argue is that whilst Cohen looked at joint ownership, and 
equal share ownership of resources11, there are other more defensible options available. 
‘For, although joint ownership of natural resources leaves individuals no freedom to do 
anything without the consent of others, and equal share ownership does too little to 
compensate for unchosen disadvantage, there are plausible accounts of the ownership of 
natural resources that avoid the problem of requiring the consent of others to do anything 
while taking the promotion of equality more seriously.’ (Vallentyne, 1998, p. 19) 
Vallentyne is essentially arguing here that although full self-ownership cannot be reconciled with 
joint ownership, this does not rule out full self-ownership from being applicable to other cases.  Here 
though, Vallentyne appears to have left himself rather open to the very same criticisms that Cohen 
aimed at others: 
‘Self-ownership is a purely formal notion, and does not ensure that one has any effective 
autonomy involving physical actions. If the rest of the world is owned by others, no physical 
action is permitted without someone else’s approval (since anything one does would involve 
using someone else’s property). In such a situation one has no effective autonomy involving 
physical actions.’ (Vallentyne, 1998, p. 6) 
He accepts that his version of self-ownership to be merely formal, since no refutation of this 
challenge is offered. However, what gives Vallentyne’s self-ownership more meaning is his ‘equal 
opportunity for welfare’ approach. This, he argues, takes the merely formal concept of self-
ownership, and embeds it within an egalitarian framework to ensure that individual autonomy is 
upheld. What will however become evident later in this thesis is that the level of autonomy afforded 
to individuals via Vallentyne’s self-ownership is significantly less than that offered by Otsuka. Just as 
Cohen criticized Nozick for failing to give ‘z’ effective autonomy, due to him being the last to 
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 Equal share ownership of resources is defended by Hillel Steiner (1994), and heavily criticised by Cohen 
(1995). 
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appropriate land, Vallentyne faces the same objection. Vallentyne can justify egalitarianism just as 
has been done by joint-ownership egalitarians: by making self-ownership ‘formal’. Although 
Vallentyne rightly points out that this attack cannot be viably pursued by right libertarians, this does 
provide an unseemly unification of self-ownership and equality. In fact, Barbara Fried’s critique of 
left-libertarianism as a whole is, in fact, much more applicable to Vallentyne than to Michael Otsuka. 
Fried argues that self-ownership is weakened so as to become obsolete an meaningless in order to fit 
within egalitarianism (Fried, 2004). The formal self-ownership that Vallentyne defends certainly falls 
into this group. 
Vallentyne almost entirely accepts the concept of full self-ownership that Cohen distills from ASU 
(Vallentyne, 2009).  These being: rights to fully manage oneself; rights to full income; and rights to 
transfer fully any of these rights through market exchange. According to Vallentyne though, the right 
to transfer resources is not fundamental to the framework of full self-ownership.  
‘One can endorse a partial form of self-ownership (e.g., control rights) without endorsing full 
self-ownership (with full tax immunities). Indeed, the unrestricted right to transfer tax 
immune wealth by gift must, I believe, be rejected by egalitarians—at least for cases of 
wealth being transferred to a person of a younger generation.’ (Vallentyne, 1998, p. 11) 
Vallentyne’s approach to ‘full’ self-ownership here seems to become increasingly pragmatic, as full 
self-ownership is championed, but the inconvenient inegalitarian elements are omitted. The 
justification for such a prohibition is that ‘such a right can give rise to wealth dynasties, and that is 
unacceptable from an egalitarian perspective’ (Vallentyne, 1998, p. 11).  This has been labelled ‘Full 
Control’ self-ownership; it consists of full liberty rights, and full security rights (Vallentyne, 2009).  
Full ownership, Vallentyne argues, is a bundle of rights that can in fact be separated from each other. 
He lists the following rights that together make up ‘full’ self-ownership: 
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(1) control rights over the use of the entity (both a liberty-right to use it and a claim-right that 
others not use it), 
(2) rights to compensation (when someone uses the entity without one’s permission), 
(3) enforcement rights (e.g., rights of prior restraint if someone is about to violate these 
rights), 
(4) rights to transfer these rights to others (by sale, rental, gift, or loan), and 
(5) immunities to the non-consensual loss of these rights. (Vallentyne, 2009, p. 4) 
 
Vallentyne argues that it is possible to have ‘full’ control rights, without having the right to then 
transfer those rights to another. He argues that the theory of full self-ownership ‘claims that, as a 
matter of normative fact, agents fully own themselves as opposed to something weaker.’ He argues 
for full conclusive and unconditional rights to the four that he lists. Anything less than this ‘full’ self-
ownership though would be a ‘departure from libertarianism in the strictest sense’.   I will argue that 
this pragmatism, with regards to the self-ownership thesis appears incoherent. Taking ‘full’ self-
ownership in the Nozickian style, and then extricating certain aspects which fail to fit within a 
designated egalitarian model seems questionable. The logic of removing transfer rights from ‘full’ 
self-ownership is therefore flawed.  
Vallentyne talks about rights as if they are somehow entirely separate, and not inevitably interlinked 
(Vallentyne, 2009). The assumption that goes with this is that transfer rights can be removed from 
individuals without their full self-ownership being limited. The ‘bundle’ of other rights would still 
constitute ‘full’ self-ownership in this event (Vallentyne, 2009, p. 59). Transfer rights cannot be 
removed from ‘full’ self-ownership without limiting the level of self-ownership available.  As a 
Nozickian full self-owner, I would have the right to control the resources that I possess, and to 
transfer them to others whenever I choose. So long as the initial acquisition of resources was just, 
then all steps leading from an initially just distribution by just means are themselves just. As such, I 
have full control over the resources at my disposal.  
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However, Vallentyne’s de-bundling of full self-ownership would see this reduced. Let us assume that 
I have ‘full control over how I use my resources, and protection against them being taken against my 
will’. Nonetheless, I would lack the control to bequeath my resources to others. The clear conclusion 
here must be that my control over my resources is lessened. Where before, under Nozick’s full self-
ownership, I could use my resources however I chose, now under Vallentyne I no longer have such 
extensive control (Vallentyne, 1998, p. 11). The ‘liberty rights’ within Vallentyne’s theory are 
therefore clearly less than full. The range of choices that I am at liberty to make with the resources 
that I possess is lessened, and therefore less than full. Here then Vallentyne falls into the problem 
that he raised concerning partial self-ownership being a ‘departure from libertarianism in the 
strictest sense’. Vallentyne notes the understanding that ‘individuals only have this full liberty 
initially’, as it can be weakened by our choices over time (Vallentyne, 2009, p. 62). But this is 
erroneous, since the liberty that individuals have initially cannot be full without the ability to transfer 
resources.  
Vallentyne does however make an important distinction between ‘natural resources’ and ‘artifacts’. 
An artifact is something that has been transformed by an agent. For example: 
‘land, seas, air, minerals, etc. in their original (unimproved) states are natural resources, 
whereas such things as chairs, buildings, and land cleared for farming are artifacts (composed 
partly of natural resources).’ (Vallentyne, 2011, p. 4) 
Since individuals have mixed their labour with natural resources and added value, ‘artifacts’ should 
therefore be deemed different to ‘natural resources’. Individuals may not necessarily transfer natural 
resources to another, and bequests are prohibited on the basis that the dead have no rights (Steiner, 
1994). Vallentyne does however support the right of individuals to transfer ‘artifacts’ during their 
lifetime, as the following reconstruction illustrates: 
1) As a full self-owner I have initial full control over my person 
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2) My rights to the produce of my labour are as strong as my rights of self-ownership 
3) I can give away my rights to my person 
4) ∴ I can give away my rights to my artifacts. 
Vallentyne argues that (1) people are full self-owners, with full control rights. In addition, (2) he 
argues that artifacts (something produced by an individual through his labour) becomes his property, 
and no other has any claim right over it. The individual in question has full control over that which 
they produce by mixing their labour with natural resources. It follows that ‘taxes on artifacts are 
deemed unjust’ (Vallentyne, 2011, p. 4). Vallentyne further argues (3) for the right of individuals to 
voluntarily enslave themselves if they so choose, so long as they make the decision of their own 
volition and with suitable understanding of the situation12. From these first 3 premises it therefore 
seems logical to suggest that any individual should have the right to give away any artifacts that they 
possess.13 If making something gives you a right to it that are equivalent to your rights over your own 
person, as Vallentyne argues, then the rights to that produce must be transferable in the same way 
that voluntary slavery is accepted. Vallentyne therefore supports the transfer of artifacts. 
Furthermore ‘If an agent fully owns a given resource, he is morally free to destroy it if he wishes’ 
(Vallentyne & Steiner, 2009). It is thus not a requirement of individuals that they must make 
sacrifices for the benefit of future generations. However, to allow artifacts to be transferred would as 
Vallentyne previously notes, allow for the setting up of hereditary dynasties and therefore is 
unstomachable for an egalitarian. To allow resources to be destroyed also allows the current 
generation to discriminate against future generations. Both of these issues are however resolved by 
Michael Otsuka.  
                                                          
12
 Vallentyne sets out a refutation of critics of voluntary slavery in (Vallentyne, 2009) 
13
 Unlike Otsuka, Vallentyne does not differentiate between things made from the person and things made 
from outside of the person. Instead, similar to Nozick he concludes that you have a stringent right to anything 
that you mix your labour with to add value. 
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4.2 Otsuka’s Self Ownership 
Michael Otsuka’s conception of self-ownership is different. Otsuka argues for a ‘robust’ self-
ownership that is ‘less than full’. In this he is following on from G.A. Cohen who was the first to 
highlight the need for ‘effective autonomy’. In SFE Cohen makes clear that self-ownership needs to 
be more ‘robust’ than that stipulated in ASU in order to protect autonomy and ensure that self-
ownership is not ‘merely formal’ (Cohen, 1995). Otsuka therefore attempts to circumvent much of 
the aforementioned criticisms of Nozick, and Vallentyne by adopting a different form of self-
ownership.  
‘Like all other versions of Lockean libertarianism, mine takes a right of self-ownership 
seriously, where such a right consists of robust and stringent rights of control over one’s 
mind, body, and life.’ (Otsuka, 2006, p. 9) 
Otsuka therefore argues that ‘robust’ self-ownership is still a form of self-ownership ‘inspired’ by 
Locke (Otsuka, 2003).  However, the key critique of Otsuka’s conception of self-ownership has been 
that it is completely separate from Lockean Libertarian self-ownership (Risse, 2004). Matthias Risse 
and Jan Narveson in particular have focused their attention upon Michael Otsuka’s attempt to join 
self-ownership and equality. This section will therefore address some of this criticism of a ‘robust’ 
self-ownership, to answer the essential question as of whether a ‘robust’ self-ownership is still 
libertarian self-ownership 
Michael Otsuka first identifies “libertarian right of self-ownership”, while ‘less than full because it 
does not prohibit all unintentional incursions upon one’s body’, includes these two rights: (Otsuka, 
1998b): 
1) ‘A very stringent right of control over and use of one’s mind and body that bars others 
from intentionally using one as a means by forcing one to sacrifice life, limb or labour, where 
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such force operates by means of incursions or threats of incursions upon one’s mind and 
body (including assault and battery and forcible arrest, detention, and imprisonment)’ 
2) ‘A very stringent right to all of the income that one can gain from one’s mind and body 
(including one’s labour) either on one’s own or through unregulated and untaxed voluntary 
exchanges with other individuals.’ (Otsuka, 2003) 
Otsuka uses his weaver example to defend (2). In this artificial world the only material available to 
make clothes with is human hair. Now the first person is hirsute and capable of weaving, whilst the 
other is incapable of weaving and bald (Otsuka, 2003, p. 18). The rights of the individual to his own 
body are deemed inalienable by libertarians. To force the weaver to give up sweaters to the bald 
man would violate his libertarian self-ownership. In this regard Otsuka agrees with Nozick. However, 
‘Nozick's objection to redistributive taxation in general is persuasive only if one mistakenly 
assimilates cases that involve worldly resources with cases that do not’ (Otsuka, 2003, p. 17). 
Nozick’s complaint is essentially on the grounds of the violation of property rights, rather than 
against being forced to work (Otsuka, 2003, p. 20).Individuals do not have the same level of control 
over resources that do not emanate from themselves.   
Otsuka does however later accept that this second point is too strong. Nir Eyal’s Wilt Hairberlain 
example illustrates the separability of rights to income from rights to the fruits of one’s labours, since 
‘this is an example of income from one’s body that is not also the result of one’s (non-trivial) labour’ 
(Eyal, 2006, p. 302).  A tax on Wilt Hairberlain is thus easier to justify. Unlike Otsuka’s weaver 
example Wilt Hairberlain is not forced to work on behalf of another in order to pay his income tax.  
Instead, He is an individual who chooses to shave his hair for his own enjoyment. He realizes 
however that other people are willing to pay considerable amounts of money for the hair that he has 
shaved. Thus he develops vast wealth, and creates massive inequality just as in the Wilt Chamberlain 
example. Eyal shows that in such a circumstance, taxation can be far more justifiable than one in 
which an individual must toil in order to pay the tax. The separation between the rights to income, 
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and the rights to the fruits of one’s labours therefore become apparent. As Hairberlain does not need 
to toil, taxing the income that he receives is much easier to support than in Otsuka’s weaver example. 
 ‘Robust’ self-ownership however differs here in that it includes a third provision which adds: 
‘Rights over enough worldly resources so that others cannot, by means of withholding access 
to their resources, force one to come to the assistance of another via sacrifice of life, limb or 
labour.’ (Otsuka, 1998b, p. 84) 
Otsuka’s ‘robust’ self-ownership thus used the libertarian rights of self-ownership, whilst also making 
provisions to ensure that ‘effective autonomy’ could be maintained (Cohen, 1995). Cohen’s critique 
of Nozick’s self-ownership is thus overcome by Otsuka’s alternative approach. Otsuka supports a 
libertarian rights to self-ownership, where individuals have the autonomy to enable them to affect 
their own lives.  In adding this in, Otsuka is accepting that his self-ownership theory is less than the 
‘full’ self-ownership preached by Nozick and Vallentyne (Nozick, 1974). Instead this acceptance 
allows for a robust framework that can accommodate stringent libertarian rights, but also 
encompasses Cohen’s ideas on the need for autonomy (Cohen, 1995).  
Unlike Vallentyne, apart from the specific case already mentioned where one’s own body is used, 
Otsuka does not believe that ‘artifacts’ necessarily have any special attachment to their creator. 
Though individuals have the right to the income of their labour, he differs in regards to ‘artifacts’. 
Allowing the first generation of inhabitants to use all resources available to them is clearly to 
discriminate against future generations (Otsuka, 1998b, p. 163). Egalitarians therefore need to place 
some restriction upon the actions of individuals in terms of intergenerational transfers.  For each 
individual to have sole rights to use or destroy the property that she occupies during her existence 
there will inevitably be problems for future generations. For example, if there are an infinite number 
of generations living in a designated area, then each individual would have to be given an infinitely 
small amount of resources from which to live. Clearly there is a considerable problem here.  The 
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solution arises in removing the right of individuals to transfer or destroy resources that they have 
appropriated. Individuals are thereby required to return resources to no-ownership when they die of 
an equivalent value to when they appropriated them. This ensures that the problems of 
intergenerational degradation can be overcome. Otsuka therefore offers a solution to the problems 
that arise in Vallentyne’s work. Since Vallentyne allows for transfer of artifacts, and allows individuals 
to destroy resources, his system cannot be sustainable in the long term. Otsuka however offers a 
system of ownership whereby resources need to be returned to ‘no-ownership’ with equivalent 
value attached. This negates the problems of intergenerational justice that plague Vallentyne. 
Furthermore, by allowing artifacts to be passed on Vallentyne is continuing the system of wealth 
accumulation that is so abhorrent to egalitarians. Therefore, though his rights over artifacts are 
seemingly ‘fuller’ than Otsuka’s, the consequences for egalitarianism are extremely negative. An 
egalitarian would be unable to support the form of ownership that Vallentyne supports.   
4.3 Vallentyne Vs Otsuka 
As identified above, Peter Vallentyne and Michael Otsuka differ significantly over their views of self-
ownership. Both agree on many aspects of self-ownership. For example that self-ownership is not 
necessarily linked with property in the way that Cohen implies, and that not all rights of self-
ownership should be upheld. However, Vallentyne’s self-ownership attempts to follow Nozick and 
employ ‘full’ self-ownership is flawed for a number of reasons. Firstly, he attempts to ‘de-bundle’ 
rights, so as to remove those which he does not think should be included (transfer rights). This is 
problematic for Vallentyne, rather than Otsuka, due to his insistence upon ‘full’ self-ownership. 
Secondly, Vallentyne makes no allowance for future generations, and deems artifacts as intrinsically 
separate from natural resources. Finally, Vallentyne supports the ‘incursion model’, whilst Otsuka 
attempts to avoid such issues. 
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Peter Vallentyne’s attempt to continue to use ‘full’ self-ownership fails to overcome the significant 
challenges that were posed to it by Cohen. His desire to accommodate egalitarianism within its 
framework appears to involve removing any aspects of ‘full’ self-ownership that are characteristically 
inegalitarian. Yet doing so purely for reasons of equality undermines the supposedly ‘full’ self-
ownership of the individuals in question. In contrast Michael Otsuka’s robust self-ownership ensures 
a level of autonomy of all involved, whilst accepting that the ‘self-ownership’ that he supports is less 
than full. Vallentyne attempts to keep a ‘full’ self-ownership, whilst removing some transfer rights, 
which as I have argued, appears to be flawed. 
In ‘Responsibility and Compensation rights’ Vallentyne’s full self-ownership clearly follows Nozick in 
adopting the ‘incursion model’, for interference in the lives of others (Vallentyne, 2009, p. 86). ‘A 
persons rights define certain boundaries, which, if crossed, raise the question of whether the right 
has been intruded upon’ (Vallentyne, 2009, p. 86). Boundary crossings are deemed the point at 
which rights can be violated. Otsuka however highlights the significant problems with such an 
approach across a number of examples (Otsuka, 2009b). ‘Full’ self-ownership necessarily implies that 
one can only be restricted in ones actions if they directly violate the rights of another.  This is 
something ‘with which anyone who is committed to self-ownership must grapple’ (Otsuka, 2009b, p. 
143). If Nozick’s notion of ‘boundary crossing’ is accepted, as would seem implicit in ‘full’ self-
ownership, then a significant number of counter examples would need to be overcome. Otsuka 
makes clear that the likes of Steiner and Vallentyne have been unable to effectively overcome these 
examples. 
Were I to build a solid and airtight casing around your property, forcing you to slowly die, would that 
constitute a breach of self-ownership boundaries? It does not appear so. I would not have involved 
any substantive border crossing, and so would I not have violated your self-ownership? Since no 
boundary is crossed by forming an airtight casing around an individual no breach of self-ownership 
has occurred. This is however a wholly unsatisfactory outcome. Intuitively it appears that I have 
25 David Minear Master’s Thesis 
affected your self-ownership by putting you in a position whereby you are unable to breathe freely. 
The incursion model however fails to overcome this challenge, and cannot show why such an 
endeavor would represent a breach of self-ownership. 
Secondly, Otsuka talks about how the imposition of risk does not in itself count as a boundary 
incursion. To force someone to play Russian Roulette against their will, where two of the six 
chambers are loaded is not in itself a boundary incursion. Obviously if the individuals were to ‘lose’ 
and be shot, then that would necessarily be a boundary incursion. But to force someone to play, and 
force them to take the risk is not a violation of self-ownership in itself. This again appear counter-
intuitive. Surely by forcing someone to take on a risk by pointing a gun at their head, then their self-
ownership is necessarily breached? Similarly if a gunman coerces an individual into yielding property 
of products would this constitute a violation of self-ownership? The incursion model is unable to 
explain how these situations represent a violation of self-ownership.  An alternative to the ‘incursion 
model’, in the form of the ‘less than full’ self-ownership that Otsuka supports therefore appears the 
logical solution. Such actions against individuals would violate clause (1) of Otsuka’s definition and 
would therefore be unacceptable. Self-ownership using Nozick’s incursion model cannot effectively 
cover situations where self-ownership is intuitively violated without ‘border crossings’ of any sort. 
Finally, Phillippa Foot’s ‘trolley problem’ further demonstrates the problems with ‘full’ self-
ownership (Otsuka, 2008). To summarise, a runaway train is set to run into a group of bystanders. 
However, an individual has an opportunity to divert the train so that it takes another route and 
avoids the group. This path will however mean than a single individual is killed.  Proponents of full 
self-ownership would oppose such a diversion as it would entail an unjustifiable breach of the 
individual’s self-ownership (by killing him). Even though such an action would save the lives of a 
greater number, it would be indefensible for a full self-owner. A system that forbade any and all 
unwanted interferences with one’s person would lead to a troubling conclusion. Full self-ownership 
simply cannot account for such situations, and would lead to the deaths of the group, rather than the 
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solitary individual. No individual may be sacrificed for any others, no matter how many others would 
stand to benefit from such an action. For this reason Otsuka rejects ‘full’ self-ownership as an 
unusable concept.  It seems entirely reasonable to divert the trolley in this situation, to save a 
greater number of lives. Otsuka thus makes clear that there must therefore be some breaches of 
individuals control over themselves, and their ownership of themselves must be ‘less than full’. 
Fundamentally, Michael Otsuka’s view of a ‘robust’ self-ownership is stronger than that of Vallentyne. 
Otsuka’s self-ownership ensures that individuals have greater freedom over their own lives. Otsuka 
offers a more autonomous individual, a more egalitarian alternative, and therefore a more viable 
framework from which to begin the left-libertarian mission.  
5 World Ownership  
Of significant consequence for Vallentyne and Otsuka’s attempts to reconcile self-ownership and 
equality are views upon the initial ownership of natural resources. There are four forms of initial 
world ownership that have been adopted by left-libertarians14. These four types of initial ownership 
of worldly resources are: joint ownership; equal ownership; common ownership; and no-ownership. 
The first two of these will not be commented upon.  Cohen’s criticisms of joint-ownership, 
demonstrate the problems with such an approach (Cohen, 1995). Furthermore, a universal 
consensus before any individual’s actions would be completely impractical. 15  Similarly, Cohen’s 
critique of Steiner’s equal ownership of resources shows how it leads to a ‘merely formal’ self-
ownership. This leaves the last two alternatives: common ownership, and no-ownership. 
Common ownership of resources means that each individual is able to use resources, but is not able 
to claim any ownership of them (initially at least), as they are owned in common with everyone else 
within society. Individuals may lay claim to resources without some form of payment to the rest of 
                                                          
14
 Risse (2004) lists three forms, leaving out the equal-ownership of Steiner et al. Presumably as a result of 
Cohen’s critique. 
15
 For a recent defense of joint ownership of resources, see Vrousalis (2011) 
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society for the value of the privately appropriated resources. No ownership on the other hand simply 
stipulates that no-one has any initial claim right over resources (Risse, 2004). Vallentyne favours 
initial common ownership of worldly resources, whilst Michael Otsuka favours initial no-ownership of 
worldly resources. Michael Otsuka’s position of no-initial ownership of natural resources is one that 
he shares with Nozick and the right libertarians.  Here then, it is Peter Vallentyne who makes a 
movement away from orthodox libertarian ideas about the initial ownership of natural resources.  
Matthias Risse, in his critique of left-libertarianism in general makes it clear however that the 
difference between common ownership of resources, and no-ownership of initial resources is a 
significant one (Risse, 2004, p. 344).  
As mentioned, Peter Vallentyne differs from most libertarians in that he supports initial common 
ownership of resources (Fischer, 2014, p. 324).In this he follows on from the writings of Henry 
George (1879).  George argued that all land should be commonly owned; this is different from joint 
ownership in an important way since it does not require universal consent in order to act.  For 
Vallentyne, some appropriation of resources must be allowed without the consent of others and to 
forbid this would be ‘crazy’. Cohen dismissed common ownership as allowing the able bodied to 
appropriate whatever resources they wished without any responsibility to help those who are less 
advantaged (Cohen, 1995, p. 104).  
Arabella Fischer defends initial common ownership by suggesting that Cohen’s criticism is not 
applicable in the case of Vallentyne or George (Fischer, 2014, p. 6). Though resources are available to 
be used by any individual, they are available for use on the basis that the individual in question owes 
something to the rest of society (Fischer, 2014, p. 6). This qualification is suggested as overcoming 
the challenge that Cohen poses to common ownership. Risse however argues that ‘common 
ownership seems to be plausible only to those who hold a view that ties individuals’ lives together 
and shares out fortunes  and misfortunes’, but no-one who supports self-ownership could ascribe to 
such a view (Risse, 2004, p. 350). Common initial ownership of resources enforces non-contractual 
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obligation upon individuals.  Thus although there is no reason why worldly resources cannot be 
initially commonly owned, the consequences of such ownership makes a reconciliation of self-
ownership and equality much harder .Initial common ownership of natural resources, as Vallentyne 
proposes, is thus feasible but produces problems in its application, as shall be shown in later chapters. 
Michael Otsuka’s explanation of initial ownership of worldly resources is however much more 
orthodox within Libertarianism: 
‘in the absence of any such belief that the earth was previously owned by some being who 
transferred this right of ownership to humankind at the outset, it is reasonable to regard the 
earth as initially unowned.’ (Otsuka, 2003, p. 22) 
However, the implication that common-ownership requires a deity is ineffectual. There is no greater 
a need for a God within common-ownership of resources than it is within self-ownership itself. This 
claim descends from Locke’s Second Treatise on Government wherein he argues that God gave the 
world to all men, and thus all men have common ownership of it.  Jan Narveson argues that outside 
of a theistic framework, common ownership is ‘meaningless’ (Narveson, 2001, p. 73). Yet as Risse 
highlights this view is incorrect (Risse, 2004, p. 18). Instead Leon Walras and Vincent Bourdeau have 
highlighted that common ownership can be grounded not in theism, but in ‘scientific observation’, 
since ‘human beings are by nature social beings’ (Otsuka, 2006a, p. 163). Though it is more common 
to err on the side of initial no-ownership of resources,  
Otsuka argues that initially, no individual has any claim right over any worldly resources. He utilises 
examples of two individuals that get washed up on a desert island to illustrate this point. Neither of 
the two castaway who arrive on the island has any claim over any of the land. Matthias Risse shows 
that in the absence of any other method of orchestrating appropriation, that the ‘first grabber’ 
principle is still in use. This does not however undermine Otsuka’s arguments at all, or necessarily 
need further explanation as Risse contends (Risse, 2004). Instead it shows how Otsuka’s theory of 
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self-ownership and equality does manage to exist largely within the confines of orthodox libertarian 
thinking.  
 ‘No-ownership’ is the clearest libertarian option for the initial ownership of natural resources. That is 
not to say that other forms cannot fit within libertarian thinking. There is nothing in self-ownership 
that necessarily implies anything about the initial ownership of world resources. Although according 
to Otsuka Cohen seemingly argues against this, he does however undermine his argument elsewhere 
by accepting that: 
‘The principle of self-ownership... says, on the face of it, nothing about anyone’s rights in 
resources other than people, and in particular nothing about the substances and capacities of 
nature, without which the things that people want cannot be produced.’ (G.A Cohen from 
Otsuka, Self-Ownership and Equality: a Lockean Reconciliation, 2006 p159) 
Left-libertarianism says nothing about the ‘rights in worldly resources beyond those that one is able 
to acquire through the exchange of one’s labour’ (Otsuka, 1998b, p. 159). There is therefore nothing 
preventing other forms of initial ownership of worldly resources. G.A Cohen illustated this in his 
examination of joint world ownership, which would offer a comparable level of ‘formal’ self-
ownership to Nozick’s no-ownership (Cohen, 1995). However, moving away from the idea of no-
ownership does create significant challenges (whether it is in the form of joint ownership, common 
ownership or equal ownership). That is not to say that initial no-ownership is irrefutable, but that it is 
certainly the simplest of the four available options to defend in terms of self-ownership.  By assessing 
the state of initial ownership of worldly resources, it is clear that both options are viable. No right 
libertarian could possibly challenge Otsuka’s no-ownership. However, Matthias Risse has attacked 
common ownership as ‘fraught with problems’ (Risse, 2004, p. 346), many of which are identifiable 
with the introduction of the Georgist proviso.  
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6 The Lockean Proviso and the appropriation of resources  
This next section will examine Peter Vallentyne’s and Michael Otsuka’s approaches to the Lockean 
proviso. As with self-ownership, I contend that Michael Otsuka’s approach is more successful in 
achieving its aims of egalitarianism and self-ownership. 
6.1 Vallentyne’s Georgist proviso  
In ‘On Original Appropriation’ Peter Vallentyne sets out a defense of a Lockean proviso (Vallentyne, 
2007). Vallentyne’s defense is targeted at the radical right-libertarianism of the likes of Jan Narveson 
and Murray Rothbard (Rothbard, 1997). Vallentyne states that the ‘satisfaction of a Lockean Proviso 
is indeed a necessary condition for the appropriation of un-owned things’ (Vallentyne, 2007). His goal 
in this article is however limited to refuting one charge against the Lockean proviso, and he does not 
defend his own interpretation. He summarises his view as ‘common ownership modified by quasi-
private appropriation’ (Fischer, 2014). Vallentyne argues that ‘no-one be worse off than would be if 
no one appropriated more than is compatible with everyone having an equally valuable opportunity 
for wellbeing’ (Vallentyne, 2013, p. 4). Vallentyne thus differs significantly from Nozick’s weak 
Lockean proviso, by building upon Richard Arneson’s ideas of equal opportunity for welfare (Arneson, 
1988). Equal opportunity for welfare will be examined further in terms of the redistribution of 
resources in a later section. However, for the time being, its relevance lies in the restrictions upon 
free appropriation of un-owned resources by individuals. Equal opportunity for welfare ensuring that 
completely free, limitless, appropriation of resources is not possible.  To maintain equal 
opportunities for all, the distribution of resources needs to be monitored and adapted, just as Nozick 
highlighted with his famous Wilt Chamberlain example (Nozick, 1974). 
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For Nozick, appropriation is ‘just’ so long as: ‘enough and as good left for others’ (Nozick, 1974). 
Vallentyne rejects Nozick’s Lockean proviso. Though he agrees with Mack that such a reading of 
Locke is the most feasible, he fundamentally disagrees with the strength of the proviso presented by 
Locke (Vallentyne, 2013, p. 4). Thus rather than criticizing Nozick’s interpretation of Locke, 
Vallentyne’s real problem lies with Locke’s Second Treatise on Government.  
‘I think it more plausible that an equally valuable share (net of compensation provided) must 
be left for others (or more radically: a share compatible with an equal opportunity for 
wellbeing).’ (Vallentyne, 2013, p. 4) 
As such, Vallentyne suggests that he differs from Locke in wanting a much tougher proviso. This 
‘egalitarian proviso’ would allow for the appropriation of resources, but only so long as an equally 
valuable share, or net compensation is left for others.  For Vallentyne ‘the left-libertarian theory 
differs from standard right-libertarian theories only with respect to the proviso’ (Vallentyne, 2013, p. 
4). The proviso suggested by Locke, and then by Nozick, fails to sufficiently provide for the needs of 
others, and therefore needs to be replaced by one that can. In this regard then Vallentyne’s 
acceptance of Nozick’s interpretation of Locke means that his own approach is distinctly unlockean. 
Instead he looks to Henry George for the solution. 
Vallentyne’s Georgist approach uses a very different form of proviso. In Progress and Poverty (1879) 
Henry George set out a new approach to formulating a proviso, based upon land rents. Herein 
George argued that individuals should be free to appropriate resources that are initially commonly 
owned (George, 1879). However, this ‘’ownership’’ can never be complete, as the individual owes 
the rest of society rent for the right have sole control over the land. The individual in question 
therefore must pay a rent on the land that is appropriated as compensation in the form of a ‘single 
tax’. George did not therefore prohibit the appropriation of resources without consent from others, 
or place any limits upon that which any individual may privately appropriate. So long as a rent is paid 
on any land that is appropriated then there is nothing prohibiting any individual from taking more 
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than one’s fair share. This allows for even freer appropriation of resources than Nozick advocates. 
Even though Nozick utilizes a weak proviso of enough and as good’ left for others, for Georgists this 
can be overcome, and even more resources may be appropriated by any individual, so long as 
compensation is paid. The Georgist proviso that Vallentyne supports thus asserts that either an 
equally valuable share of resources be left, or net compensation be offered to those now unable to 
appropriate the resources. As a Georgist Vallentyne thus argues that private appropriation should be 
allowed, so long as the cost to society is paid.  
The land tax is justified on the basis that it is not taking the proceeds of anyone’s individual 
endeavors from them, but removing a rent that is already attached to the land (Vallentyne, 2000). 
The payment is fixed to the land, and not to anyone’s ability to benefit from the proceeds of their 
work. Since Cohen and others accept that land is to not necessarily tied to self-ownership, having a 
fixed price to pay on the value of land is a valid tax. It is simply deemed as an unavoidable 
component of ownership of resources, rather than an impediment to full self-ownership. By taxing 
the land that is appropriated Vallentyne believes that he is able to avoid Nozick’s criticisms of 
taxation as ‘’forced labour’’ (Nozick, 1974). A man who appropriates resources, and mixes them with 
his labour to create value has, according to Vallentyne and Nozick, every right to the value of that 
produce. However the difference arises in the original ownership of natural resources. Since 
Vallentyne holds that individuals do not have a full right to own natural resources, his taxation of said 
resources can be upheld without impacting the self-ownership of individuals, who remain free to do 
whatever they choose, and profit however they can from the land available to them.  
For example, imagine a desert island where two people (A and B) are washed ashore. A, in 
accordance with his rights as a full self-owner, has the right to appropriate as many of the resources 
as he chooses. For this privilege though he must pay rent for this appropriation to B in order to cover 
the potential loss that the second person has incurred from the appropriation. The value that has 
been lost by second person due to the first ones appropriation needs to be compensated. Where 
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Vallentyne differs from George is in the scale of the taxation (Fischer, 2014). As a supporter of an 
‘’equal opportunity for welfare’’ Vallentyne thus argues for a stringent redistribution of resources to 
equalize opportunities for welfare.  Essentially, the first appropriator, though fully within his rights to 
appropriate whatever he chooses, must pay rent to the other to ensure that each has an equal 
opportunity for welfare.  
Unlike a ‘starting gate’ theory16 such as Nozick’s entitlement theory, this process of re-allocating 
resources must happen continuously to ensure that both one and two have an equal opportunity to 
welfare, despite the private appropriation by one (Vallentyne, 2011). Rather than being a ‘purely 
procedural’ theory of justice, Vallentyne offers a method of maintaining equality as well as self-
ownership. Thus he offers ‘justice’ not only in terms of the duties that are owed to individuals, but 
also in terms of fairness and moral permissibility. In theory at least, Vallentyne’s Georgist proviso 
allows for full-self-ownership to be reconciled with the egalitarianism of equal opportunity for 
welfare. By compelling those who choose to remove land from communal use to pay rent, the 
benefits of the appropriation can be shared equally within society.  
6.2 Otsuka’s proviso 
Although Michael Otsuka’s approach is very different, unsurprisingly, he also criticizes Nozick’s weak 
proviso and puts forwards an alternative proviso. In Libertarianism without inequality the solution 
comes in the form of the welfarist egalitarian proviso (Otsuka, 2003). As mentioned in section 2, G.A 
Cohen argued that an egalitarian proviso could not be reconciled with self-ownership, even in a 
‘robust’ form.  This stronger proviso is effectively that: 
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 A principle of justice where the initial set of rules are all that is set in place, and where ‘’any distribution of 
resources following from another distribution of resources by just means is itself just’’ (Nozick, 1974) 
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‘You may acquire previously unowned worldly resources if and only if you leave enough so 
that everyone else can acquire an equally advantageous share of unowned worldly resources’ 
(Otsuka, 2003, p. 24) 
Michael Otsuka, like Vallentyne, offers a potential way around this problem. Otsuka’s solution 
involves a specific form of the egalitarian proviso that can be reconciled with self-ownership in a 
satisfactory way. 
‘Welfarist specification of the egalitarian proviso: Someone else's share is as advantageous as 
yours if and only if it is such that she would be able (by producing, consuming, or trading) to 
better herself to the same degree as you, where betterment’ is to be measured in terms of 
level of welfare understood as the ‘satisfaction of the self-interested preferences that the 
individual would have after ideal deliberation while thinking clearly with full pertinent 
information regarding those preferences’ (Otsuka, 2003, p. 27) 
The opportunity for welfare metric is deemed as the best solution to achieve the value of fairness. 
On an island with two people it can be shown that people do not have an equal claim to resources. 
Of the two people, A is far more capable than B simply because of mental and physical capacities. If B 
were to be given all the resources leaving A with none, then they would by equally well off in terms 
of opportunity for welfare.  
‘ceteris paribus, someone who would, through no fault of his on account of his mental and 
physical constitution, be worse off in terms of welfare than another under an equal 
distribution of resources has a greater claim on the island's resources than another who 
would be better off than he in terms of welfare’ (Otsuka, 2003, p. 30). 
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Suggesting that each has an equal right to resources would in Otsuka’s argument be to suggest that 
‘unfairness of a principle of acquisition which preserves disparities in the absolute levels of welfare of 
individuals caused by differences in their mental and physical constitution that are traceable to luck’ 
(Otsuka, 2003, p. 31). Therefore only a principle that takes into account the effects of luck can 
remove the unfairness. A in Otsuka’s example has no claim to resources. To do so would presuppose 
that A has a right to appropriate unowned resources at the expense of B. This would however reduce 
B’s situation to a level below that of A’s before any resources were brought into play. There is 
therefore no inherent claim-right to resources linked to self-ownership. The spread of resources 
within society must be done so as to satisfy the equality of opportunity for welfare. No-one therefore 
necessarily has the right to appropriate resources purely of their own volition. Here Otsuka differs 
considerably from Nozick, and more intriguingly from Vallentyne. Even though Vallentyne taxed free 
private appropriation, it was still allowed. Otsuka however stands out as removing the ability of 
individuals to freely appropriate resources at will from the equation. The welfarist specification of 
the egalitarian proviso provides a somewhat simpler solution than Vallentyne to the problem of the 
Lockean proviso. As will be shown next, this approach is much stronger and more defensible than 
Vallentyne’s georgism. 
6.3 Vallentyne Vs. Otsuka 
Peter Vallentyne’s proviso has a number of problems. These issues make it evident that Michael 
Otsuka’s version of the proviso is somewhat more effective. This is in both ensuring a more 
egalitarian reading of the proviso, and also in the contradictions within Vallentyne’s proviso that 
undermine his concept of full self-ownership. The problems with Vallentyne’s proviso include: 
problems over taxation and not compensating sufficiently for illness or disease. The issues 
concerning taxation will be addressed in another section wherein Vallentyne’s taxation policy is 
contrasted with that of Michael Otsuka. Vallentyne’s Georgist proviso allows individuals to 
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appropriate as many resources as they choose, so long as rent is paid for the loss suffered by the rest 
of society. Here Vallentyne and Otsuka diverge. 
Otsuka argues ‘that such a right of self-ownership would not be robust if one lacked access to natural 
resources that are sufficient for one’s own subsistence.’ Although under Vallentyne’s framework 
resources would still need to be redistributed, this would be dependent upon the private 
appropriation of resources. Take the much heralded Able-Unable example. An island has two 
inhabitants, one of whom is ‘Able’, whilst the other is ‘Unable’. As mentioned in the previous section, 
under Otsuka’s equal opportunity for welfare, ‘Unable’ could be able to gain ownership over such a 
percentage of the resources so as to motivate ‘Able’ to work for him. This would be the situation if 
ownership over most or all of the resources would ensure that each of the two individuals had an 
equal opportunity for welfare. However, I will now illustrate the problems that occur when 
Vallentyne’s framework is employed. By using Cohen’s Able-Unable argument, the problems of a 
Georgist proviso can be highlighted. 
In an initially commonly owned world, both Able and Unable would have the right to use the 
commonly owned property. In this commonly owned world would it be possible for Able to survive 
without privately appropriating resources?  If so, then Unable will receive no form of support 
through the redistribution of appropriated resources. If Able chooses to live without privately 
appropriating resources then Unable will surely die.  If the assistance that would come via 
redistribution from appropriation is not forthcoming then there will be no way of equalizing 
opportunity for welfare between Able and Unable.  Therefore if ‘’appropriation’’ is viewed in terms 
of property rights, and having control over land, then if Able were to choose not to appropriate 
resources, then Unable would be unable to survive. Such a situation could not be accepted by 
egalitarians. 
It would be a reasonable response however to suggest that it would be impossible to sustain oneself 
on the island without appropriating resources. By picking berries or collecting fallen coconuts Able is 
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clearly appropriating natural resources just as if he were to fence off a part of the island. By taking 
those resources he is removing their value from the communal pool.  Since Vallentyne demands a 
rent on natural resources that are appropriated, then a tax could be levied upon Able’s use of 
resources to assist Unable, and equalize opportunity for welfare. There are however problems here.  
Under Vallentyne’s system Able would be liable to pay sufficient rent upon the natural resources that 
he appropriated so as to make it necessary for him to appropriate enough resources for himself and 
Unable to have a good life. 
It is not too much of a stretch to then assume that Unable is liable to die fairly promptly without the 
support of Able. At the very least the assumption that Unable will die considerably quicker than Able 
seems very reasonable. This being the case, there is nothing at all stopping Able from simply waiting 
for Unable to die (Palmer, 1998). As Cohen mentioned when initially using the example, Able is a 
‘non-altruistic, ascetic and thus easily satisfied without caring whether the unable person is satisfied 
as well’ (Risse, 2004, p. 346).  He has no intrinsic reason to keep Unable alive. With initial common 
ownership of resources and the Georgist proviso it is not possible to compel Able to work for the 
benefit of Unable.  
It would appear to be a rational decision on the part of Able to refuse to appropriate any resources.  
The Georgist proviso requires the private appropriation of resources before any redistribution can be 
offered. If no land or resources are privately appropriated, then no rent upon those resources can be 
charged. Thus Able could wait for Unable to die, before gaining full control over all of the resources 
on the island, and keeping 100% of the resources that he appropriates. This way ensures that in the 
longer term Able is able to keep his produce, and ensures that he has full control over the entire 
island. A Georgist proviso bases its egalitarianism upon rent payments from resources that 
individuals appropriate. If Able chooses instead to play the waiting game so to speak, there is nothing 
that a proponent of the Georgist proviso could do about it. The outcome of this is wholly 
unacceptable to egalitarians, and renders Unable’s self-ownership ‘merely formal’ just as much as 
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Nozick’s conception within ASU.  Unable has no ability to exert any form of autonomy, due to being 
left to die slowly, without any opportunity for welfare. 
In contrast, Vrousalis (2011) notes that ‘Otsuka’s argument in this connection is that endowing 
Unable with scarce, and therefore expensive, resources will elicit fully voluntary exchanges with Able.’ 
Although Vrousalis expresses some doubts about the quality of such a system, it is undoubtedly 
superior to that put forwards by Vallentyne in this regard. Allowing Unable ownership over so much 
of the islands resources that Able is forced to work for him appears to be the only way for an 
egalitarian solution to the Able-Unable conundrum. Initial common ownership of resources would 
allow able to exist on the common land, but if Unable owned all resources then it would not be 
possible to avoid becoming tied up in a contractual obligation to Unable in order to be on his land. It 
would necessarily inhibit Able’s effective autonomy, in order to ensure the survival of both. This 
scenario, though compromising self-ownership, has to be seen as superior outcome by an egalitarian. 
Obviously making Able’s self-ownership ‘merely formal’ is an undesirable outcome; however it is 
something that must be done in such extreme cases to avoid human tragedy. By providing such 
provisions, Otsuka’s welfarist specification of the egalitarian Lockean proviso must be deemed 
superior to the Georgist proviso that Vallentyne utilizes.  
6.4 Otsuka on taxation  
Like Vallentyne, Otsuka agrees that there is a need for revenues in order to carry out his egalitarian 
provisions. As mentioned above, Peter Vallentyne’s Georgist approach utilizes heavy taxation upon 
land to fulfill its proviso. Michael Otsuka however takes a very different approach to taxation. For 
Vallentyne, a single tax should be levied upon land. However, Otsuka argues that tax should only be 
levied upon those who commit injustices within the system (Otsuka, 2003). The ‘unjust’ will thus pay 
for the redistribution that will be required for the disabled. This ensures that taxation is not raised 
indiscriminately, for Otsuka agrees to Cohen’s idea that though taxation is not the same as forced 
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labour, it is nonetheless a hindrance to self-ownership. Wherever possible, ensuring that only those 
who commit an injustice are taxed means that all people have a viable sway of opting out of the 
taxation: by following the rule of law. The taxation therefore does not constitute a breach of self-
ownership rather the right has been forfeited. Nozick himself accepts that there are unanswered 
questions as to how those who commit injustices should be dealt with, and how ‘justice’ should be 
restored. In this he appears to accept that those who commit injustices are liable to lose some of 
their rights (Nozick, 1974). In this case that means forfeiting their right to the sole benefit of their 
produce.  
Taxing the unjust, rather than the entire population, enables self-ownership to be preserved for 
those who follow the rules. Those who act justly will retain their ability to use their resources as they 
see fit, without being compelled to come to the aid of any other. The necessary rebalancing of 
resources within the society over time will therefore be done at the expense of those who fail to 
operate within the rules. Taxing the unjust, though not as attractive as universal taxation, would be 
supported by egalitarians. Otsuka questions whether egalitarians would really oppose a system of 
non-universal giving whereby the disabled are fully provided for.  
In addition however, Otsuka makes clear that there will inevitably be some circumstances where 
some form of extra taxation is inevitable and unavoidable. The income received from taxing the 
unjust may not cover the needs of the less well off. However, ‘even a partial replacement of universal 
taxation with the taxation of the unjust is desirable from a libertarian point of view’ (Otsuka, 2006a). 
In these instances he argues that only an ‘unreasonably fanatical devotee of a right self-ownership 
could insist that such a right is so stringent that it rules out the imposition of a tax’ (Otsuka, 1998b, p. 
154).  Otsuka agrees with Cohen that Nozick’s complaint against taxation is not about forced labour 
but a violation of property rights. Since the right of self –ownership he puts forward is less stringent 
than libertarians think it is, ‘it may justifiably be infringed in this circumstance’ (Otsuka, 1998b, p. 
155).  
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Taxation can be acceptable in the context of purchasing land with the proviso that a certain rent or 
tax is already attached to that land. For example, a farmer purchases land that came with the 
connotation that a certain amount must be donated to the needy. The ‘state’ could therefore 
legitimately step in to force her to comply, without infringing any property rights. This approach lies 
very close to Vallentyne’s Georgism. However, there are significant differences between taxation 
within Vallentyne and Otsuka. The fundamental difference that I will highlight is that whilst taxation 
can be an important element in some instances within Otsuka’s framework, it is by no means integral. 
There are a vast array of instances wherein no taxation at all is required, or where taxing the unjust 
would cover the costs. For example, a Otsukian distribution of resources to maximize equal 
opportunity for welfare would not necessarily demand taxation. In an island of two people wherein 
each is accepted to have no initial claim right to any resources, then it is more than possible for each 
to appropriate sufficient resources without the need for taxation. In order to make up for the natural 
differences which may exist between the two people, the available land will be distributed between 
them accordingly. Taxation is thus not inherent at all within such a set up, and is by no means 
essential. Tied to this is the fact that for Otsuka, as taxation remains a difficult subject, it is something 
which can be readily avoided in most instances. As a result, Otsuka is able to avoid more of the 
problems that Cohen highlights with taxation than Vallentyne manages. 
This is completely different to Vallentyne’s allowance for appropriation on the proviso that rent be 
paid to cover for equal opportunity for welfare between individuals. Within this system, it is unlikely 
to be possible to appropriate resources from the communal pool without having to pay rent on them. 
Otsuka relies much less on the need for taxation. Furthermore, the utilization of the ‘unjust’ to cover 
the cost of the disabled allows for the redistribution of resources. Nozick argued that the only way to 
redistribute resources was through taxation that was equivalent to forced labour. But Otsuka’s 
approach manages to sustain ‘patterns’ in society, without self-ownership being compromised by 
excessive taxation. Since each person has the choice whether to commit an injustice or not, the tax 
upon the unjust is readily avoidable, those who pay it do so having had the chance to avoid doing so. 
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They therefore cannot be suggested as being subject to ‘forced labour’, since the taxation is the 
result of their own individual choices, and could have been avoided. 
Michael Otsuka’s views upon taxation thus differ from Peter Vallentyne’s. These differences mean 
that Otsuka’s approach to taxation is more suitable for the left-libertarian project. The reasons that 
Otsuka gives to justify a form of a land tax are not applicable to Vallentyne. He works on the basis 
that an individual who chooses to purchase land that has rent attached to it does so freely and of his 
own volition. In this instance it is not really taxation, but a form of contractual payment. However, 
this does not apply to Vallentyne’s Georgist approach. Within this system there is no alternative to 
paying rent on the land that one appropriates. As a result it is impossible for anyone to avoid having 
to pay rent in order to appropriate land for themselves. Since it is not reasonably possible to avoid 
such payments, it cannot be deemed to be down to individual choice to the same extent that 
Otsuka’s is. Since rent payments are unavoidable, they stop being an optional choice that an 
individual may take up, and become a compulsory form of tax. Thus, the land rents that Vallentyne 
supports struggle to overcome the challenges of taxation that Cohen highlighted. Otsuka’s use of 
taxation is however fundamentally different. Rather than being the central tenet of his thesis, 
taxation is considered a largely unwanted addition that is recognized to be occasionally unavoidable. 
He does however make no bones about accepting that taxation is a tricky area for those supporting 
self-ownership.  The relatively lesser position of taxation within Otsuka’s theory represents a 
considerable strength, given the difficulties that Cohen and others have had refuting Nozick’s critique 
of taxation. 
7 Redistribution of resources   
All egalitarians differ from Nozick in terms of the need to redistribute resources and argue for ‘some 
sort of promotion of equality of material advantage (perhaps constrained by certain rights)’ 
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(Vallentyne, 2002, p. 530).  How best to redistribute resources is a highly contentious subject within 
both left-libertarianism, but also egalitarianism in general. 
Peter Vallentyne’s approach amounts to a far less egalitarian redistribution of resource, and is one 
that luck egalitarians17 would be loathed to accept. The differences that arise centre largely upon 
what exactly should be done to overcome the impact of bad luck. Equal opportunities for welfare 
left-libertarians, like egalitarians in general, are in favour of taking luck into account when 
redistributing resources. Ronald Dworkin for example raised the idea of compensating for bad ‘brute’ 
luck, events that the individual in question did not influence, or could not reasonably be expected to 
have had knowledge of influencing. This idea has formed the basis for recent material egalitarianism 
(Vallentyne, 2002).  
7.1 Vallentyne on redistribution  
Peter Vallentyne’s egalitarian theory views justice in terms of ‘what we owe others’ (Vallentyne, 
2002). He separates himself from other left-libertarians and egalitarians by not accepting all forms of 
brute luck as worthy of compensation form society. Instead he argues ‘in favor of equality of initial 
opportunities for advantage and against equality of brute luck advantage’ (Vallentyne, 2002, p. 532).  
‘Brute’ luck will include some form of outcome luck as well as the luck enjoyed in initial opportunities 
for advantage that Vallentyne supports. To argue for this separation Vallentyne first sets out the four 
factors that work together to jointly determine what outcomes are realised in whatever situation: 
brute luck in initial opportunities; brute outcome luck; individual choices; option outcome luck 
(Vallentyne, 2002, p. 15).  These four categories are deemed distinct. Whilst for Dworkin and others 
‘choice’ came under ‘option luck’ Vallentyne differentiates between the two. Non-risky decisions 
which are personal choices are deemed to be distinct from optional risks that an individual might 
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 Luck egalitarians argue that resources should be redistributed to account for the effects of ‘luck’, see 
Dworkin (1981) 
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take. Where no luck is involved at all, and things are simply a matter of choice, these actions have 
been placed into the new category of ‘choices’.  
Brute luck in initial opportunities means that at the start of proceedings, all unintended or unearned 
differences between individuals, that come down to ‘brute’ luck should attract compensation. The 
final two factors regard outcomes, that is, making sure that everyone has a ‘fair’ outcome from the 
situation. Option outcome luck is the difference in outcomes that occurs due to the different risks 
that individuals take over time. Finally, brute outcome luck is the difference between individuals due 
to factors beyond the immediate control of the individual.  
‘Unavoidability is at the core of the characterization of brute luck, but it seems plausible also 
to include (1) events for which the agent has no ability to influence the probability, and (2) 
events for which the agent is unaware of his/her ability to influence the probability (because 
of false or incomplete beliefs)’ (Vallentyne, 2002, p. 540) 
Brute outcome luck (Dworkin) thus suggests that all differences between individuals that cannot be 
reasonably deemed as choices, or bad option luck must be equalized. Vallentyne rejects each option 
except brute luck in initial opportunities. His graphic demonstration of this is set out in Figure1: 
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(Figure 1: Vallentyne, Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial opportunities, 2002, p. 16) 
This example shows a situation wherein each of the four factors influences the final outcome. The 
problems with equalizing for brute outcome luck, choice and option outcome luck can therefore be 
clearly identified. For the initial agent there is a 20% chance of a brute luck event occurring that 
would prevent any further ‘choices or chance events’ (Vallentyne, 2002, p. 546). Following this, the 
80% have the choice between a guaranteed outcome of 5 (c1) or the more risky strategy (c2) with 
the opportunity for a much higher pay-off. Finally, those who took the risk face the option luck 
outcome where they have a 10% chance of 30 and a 90% chance of gaining 2. ‘’Equality of initial 
opportunity for advantage calls for equality in value of initial decisions-trees that each agent 
confronts’’ (Vallentyne, 2002). Therefore, each agent has the same initial chance to gain as any other 
individual, and therefore has an equal initial opportunity for welfare. So long as each individual has 
the same initial opportunities, then such a system is deemed just. Brute option luck on the other 
hand also requires compensation for inequalities in brute outcome luck18. 
Vallentyne goes on to illustrate that ‘justice does not require the equalization of brute outcome luck 
advantage’ (Vallentyne, 2002, p. 23).  The administrative costs for a scheme that also provides for 
brute outcome luck are likely to be significantly higher. Brute outcome luck should only be taken into 
account when it increases it increases a person’s initial opportunities. It may also have adverse 
effects on people’s behaviors. For example, people could become more likely to take more risks.  If 
the initial opportunity for advantage faced by each individual is valuable under the brute outcome 
luck compensation scheme, then justice would forbid such a scheme.  
Essentially, initial opportunity egalitarians take an ex ante approach, whilst brute luck egalitarians 
take an ex post approach. An ex post approach is insensitive to the potential costs of imposing such 
equality. The costs of equality are factored in within a ex ante perspective. Vallentyne then tackles a 
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 For example, the impact of the brute luck event where individuals have a 20% chance of receiving an 
outcome of 0 should be redistributed for. 
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second issue with initial opportunity egalitarianism: that all members of a supposedly better off 
group owe compensation to the less well-off group (Vallentyne, 2002). That means that even the 
small number of poor individuals within the better off group owe resources to those within the less 
well-off group, even those who are much better off. This seems incredibly counterintuitive. However 
Vallentyne makes clear that the idea that someone with a miserable life might owe something to 
someone with a wonderful life is also prevalent within brute outcome egalitarianism. More 
substantively, he argues that some compensation for brute outcome luck will generally be provided. 
For example, those who have been unlucky and lead miserable lives may be not required to provide 
compensation. 
Finally, Vallentyne tackles the question of what should be done in the situation where new 
information arises that alters the chances that individuals have. For example: 
‘equalization is provided between two children at the beginning of their lives, and it is later 
discovered that one of the children had a previously undetected genetic predisposition to a 
certain disease, it seems quite unjust not to provide compensation simply because we were 
initially unable to detect this disposition.’ (Vallentyne, 2002, p. 33) 
In this situation it is clear that initial opportunity for advantage was not calculated effectively. Since 
the two were believed to be equal, but they have turned out to not have been, then the child in 
question is deserving of some compensation in order for the initial opportunity of the two to have 
been equal. 
7.2 Criticisms of Vallentnye’s redistribution of resources  
As Vallentyne notes, his approach to redistribution is unstomachable for many, if not most, 
egalitarians. I will argue that such an approach is also unreasonably arbitrary in discerning which 
factors deserve to be equalized and when. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Vallentyne argues 
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that it is only fair for a child who has a previously un-noticed genetic condition that will affect his life 
be given extra compensation. Since information was not available at the time of redistribution of 
resources to ensure equality of initial opportunity compensation is used to make up for this. 
 However, as Brian Barry makes clear, Vallentyne’s initial opportunity for welfare metric would 
support the formation of a caste system. The castes are decided upon by some ‘equal opportunity 
randomizing device’ (Vallentyne, 2002, p. 27), which each individual within society enters into.  Each 
individual has the same initial brute luck opportunity to be in any caste. Such a system would be 
wholly inegalitarian, and would unfairly prejudice those unfortunate individuals who ended up in a 
lowly caste equivalent to the Dalits (‘untouchables’) within the Indian caste system. Since at the 
advent of the lottery each individual had the exact same opportunities and identical chances of 
entering into any caste initial opportunity for welfare egalitarianism does not require the 
redistribution of resources (Barry, 1988). Obviously, a brute outcome luck egalitarian would be 
unwilling to allow such a situation to arise, since it would inevitably create massive inequality for no 
reason other than brute luck. As each individual had an identical initial opportunity for welfare, there 
is no inherent reason why such a scheme could not exist in Vallentyne’s framework. This highlights 
the significant problems of only equalizing initial opportunities, as subsequent brute luck events such 
as the caste lottery are deemed acceptable. 
Vallentyne concedes that Barry has ‘common sense intuition on his side’ but attempts to refute his 
conclusion (Vallentyne, 2002, p. 27). He argues that caste systems are almost always unjust for a 
number of reasons, but that that it could be possible for there to be ‘justice’ within one. So long as 
there are no other forms of injustice going on, then such a system is supposedly acceptable. 
Vallentyne is however forced to concede that ‘inequalities of social status are more likely to arise on 
initial opportunity egalitarianism’ (Vallentyne, 2002, p. 27). Initial opportunity for welfare 
egalitarianism can therefore be seen to support a wholly inegalitarian system.  
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On discovering the genetic condition the child is suddenly able to claim compensation on the basis 
that that genetic defect should have been compensated for at the start. What then is stopping the 
person affected by the caste system from gaining the same compensation on the basis that neither 
she nor anyone else knew that she would be put into a lowly caste? Both afflictions are previously 
unknown things that affect the opportunities for wellbeing of individuals. However, Vallentyne 
argues that only conditions that are certainties after the start point should be redistributed for. For 
example, if it was definite that the woman would be placed into a lowly caste then resources would 
be redistributed to her. If though, she had an equal chance with everyone else of attaining a place in 
any of the other castes, and just happened to be unfortunate, then there is no inherent need to 
redistribute resources. Subsequent brute outcomes are largely irrelevant in terms of redistributing 
resources. To suggest that one should be compensated simply because an affliction was certain 
seems unreasonably arbitrary. The woman placed into a lowly caste has also been afflicted by 
something completely uncontrollable. Her life might be just as affected as the child with the genetic 
disorder, and yet her misfortune goes unaided.  
7.3 Arbitrary nature of a starting point 
Vallentyne realizes that he must answer the question: ‘What point in a person’s life counts as the 
“initial” point for the purposes of evaluating opportunities?’ (Vallentyne, 2002, p. 18). He suggests 
two possible options for when the start point could be: the ‘full moral standing view’ put forwards by 
Richard Arneson which he disputes19, and the partial moral standing view. Though he leaves the 
question open, either starting point appears incredibly arbitrary. Why should bad brute luck that 
occurs to an individual be compensated when they are young, but not when they are older? Brute 
luck is unavoidable by definition, so why would moral standing affect society’s responsibility to help 
individuals. This is a considerable challenge that Vallentyne himself notices (Vallentyne, 2002, p. 20). 
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 The problem of ‘sentient individuals not capable of rational agency’ such as mentally impaired individuals 
would be left out if ‘full moral standing’ were taken as the prerequisite (Vallentyne, 2002, p. 19) 
48 David Minear Master’s Thesis 
He argues that equalizing initial opportunities: 
‘It does not draw the line between what happens before the initial point and what happens 
after. Rather, it assesses the chances for advantage relative to that initial point. If at that 
point there is a 100% chance that a bad brute luck event will happen some 20 years later, the 
evaluation of the opportunity set will fully reflect the occurrence of that event. Thus, if one 
individual faces such an event and an otherwise identically situated agent does not, then 
initial opportunity egalitarianism requires that full compensation be given to the first 
individual.’ (Vallentyne, 2002, p. 20) 
Vallentyne thus asserts that the line is not arbitrary since events that take place after the ‘start’ can 
still often be redistributed for. Cases such as the genetic condition, where an individual has a 100% 
chance of having a condition means that the initial redistribution of opportunities was insufficient. 
For Vallentyne, such a situation therefore shows that there is not such an arbitrary line as might be 
suspected. 
This is however not the case. Later events or situations that arise can be redistributed for, but only 
on the condition that there is a ‘100% chance that a bad brute luck event will happen’. In the genetic 
condition case redistribution is needed because there is an unknown 100% chance of the individual 
having the affliction. Out of two people (A and B) , if A were to later develop a debilitating genetic 
condition then it would need to be redistributed for. Their initial opportunity for developing the 
affliction would have been unequal, and so to satisfy Vallentyne’s ‘initial opportunity for advantage’ 
metric redistribution is needed. This is done to compensate for the initial inequality between A and 
B’s positions. 
 Alternatively though, if each individual still had an equal opportunity of being afflicted by bad brute 
luck, then there is no longer a need to backdate redistribution. For example, if A and B have an equal 
initial opportunity of getting struck by lightning over the course of their lifetimes, say 50%, then 
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according to Vallentyne the situation is different. This event would count as ‘brute outcome luck’. 
Since each individual began with an equal opportunity for welfare, with the same chance of getting 
struck by lightning, there is therefore no need to redistribute to compensate for brute outcomes. 
Since each has the same initial opportunity Vallentyne would suggest that subsequent redistribution 
is not necessarily required.  In the earlier example, each person had an exactly equal initial chance of 
being struck by lightning, thus the situation was fair. The fact that someone then is struck by 
lightning is unfortunate, but not necessarily worthy of redistribution according to Vallentyne.   
The question of an arbitrary starting point is therefore still an important one.   Imagine that the 
aforementioned woman who is struck by lightning had the misfortune to have been struck by 
lightning as a child as well. However, this was before she had developed the ‘partial moral standing’ 
that Vallentyne deems the cut-off point. The effects of the lightning strike might have been 
essentially the same in both instances, and affected her just as greatly, if not more when she was 
older. It is therefore strangely arbitrary to suggest a cut-off point whereafter individuals will no 
longer receive societal assistance for the problems caused by bad brute luck. Given that bad brute 
luck is not the result of rational or irrational action, then why should rational agency be relevant in 
determining when someone deserves compensation? The woman struck by lightning is in just as 
much need as she was when struck as a child. The situation was just as unavoidable, and so the 
dedication of an ‘’initial point’’ is questionable. This appears wholly unsatisfactory from an egalitarian 
point of view. It is discriminatory against those of at least ‘partial moral standing’, without there 
being any justifiable reason for doing so. Having moral standing in no way necessarily enables an 
individual to overcome brute luck in a satisfactory way.  
Finally, I will return to the lightning example to illustrate the potential loss of effective autonomy in 
such a framework. If struck I would be rendered largely helpless, with my ‘initial opportunity for 
welfare’ having literally gone up in smoke. With a drastically reduced opportunity for welfare, my 
situation would be similar to that of that landless within Nozick’s entitlement theory. Cohen’s 
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criticism of the ‘merely formal’ self-ownership that would be created, is relevant to a critique of 
Vallentyne. Though officially a ‘self-owner’ I would be forced to work for someone else, and give up 
some of my rights of self-ownership20. My rights to control my life would remain in place, but these 
rights would be subjugated by the need to attain enough resources to survive. Failing to compensate 
for brute outcome luck would thus hinder the ‘effective autonomy’ of individuals. I would, without 
some form of assistance from society, not be able to have autonomous control over my actions. Thus 
self-ownership, if thought of as something more than formal, would be significantly hindered in such 
a scenario. This is of consequence for Vallentyne because his theory of justice depends on the 
redistribution of resources giving individuals the ‘robustness’ of self-ownership that they would 
otherwise lack (Vallentyne, 2009). Removing the redistribution of resources from certain individuals 
prevents them from attaining the more than formal form of self-ownership that he appears to 
support.  
7.4 Otsuka on redistribution 
Michael Otsuka’s approach to redistribution of resources is very different. Whilst Vallentyne’s 
argument justified why not all forms of brute luck should be compensated for, Otsuka’s is instead 
justifying why only option luck should be left uncompensated (Otsuka, 2009a). Here then the 
divergent scale of redistribution can be clearly witnessed. Michael Otsuka’s redistribution of 
resources will be shown to be both more egalitarian, and also to offer greater autonomy to 
individuals. 
 ‘Extreme luck egalitarianism’ asserts that the state has a duty to eliminate all unchosen disadvantage, 
and that this can never be overridden (Otsuka, 2006a, p. 165). This view is unacceptable to any 
libertarian as it would severely impede an individual’s rights to self-ownership. Otsuka argues that he 
is a ‘moderate luck egalitarian’. In this sense he is similar to the likes of Cohen and Dworkin. He 
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 This argument forms the basis of the socialist rejection of capitalism 
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accepts that there are instances in which one must ‘acknowledges that this reason may be 
overridden by conflicting reasons that tell against such elimination’ (Otsuka, 2006a, p. 165). 
Gosseries, amongst others, has argued that left-libertarianism and luck egalitarianism are 
incompatible (Gosseries, 2006).  Otsuka succinctly condenses Gosseries’ argument thus: 
‘It is a premise of left-libertarianism that the state may not take more from the talented by 
virtue of their superior talents and his related claim that left-libertarians will want to avoid 
the  taxation of the fruits of people’s labour in order to preserve self-ownership’ (Otsuka, 
2006a, p. 166) 
However, a right of self-ownership does not in itself necessarily imply any unfettered right over 
natural resources. Therefore a tax on natural resources can be justified. Instead, luck egalitarianism, 
as a method of equalizing unchosen differences, can be basically viewed as ‘equality of opportunity 
for advantage’. This in itself is intrinsically similar to left-libertarians like Otsuka who seek equality of 
opportunity for welfare. The left-libertarian project can thus be viewed as fundamentally compatible 
with ‘moderate luck egalitarianism’. Such moderation is not a weakening per se, since ‘extreme’ luck 
egalitarianism would be completely unsupportable21.  
Otsuka proposes an alternative ‘revised argument for the unfairness of brute (but not of option) 
moral luck’: 
 ‘P1. A person is blameworthy only if others would be justified in reproaching him, where 
such reprobation is a sanction. 
 P2∗. Being a sanction, such reprobation is subject to a requirement of fairness that 
allows for the imposition of a sanction only if it was possible for the sanctioned individual 
to avoid being sanctioned altogether.  
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 There is little to no support for extreme luck egalitarianism from contemporary philosophers 
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 Therefore, a person is blameworthy only if it was possible for him to avoid being 
sanctioned altogether.’ (Otsuka, 2009a) 
Otsuka thus makes it clear that option moral luck should be permitted. In cases of ‘unavoidable 
blameworthiness’ then fairness requires that compensation be given. If an individual could not 
reasonably be blamed for causing the event, then Otsuka would argue that it must be compensated 
for. However, if a situation was avoidable, and yet an individual chose to take that course of action 
should not necessarily be compensated. An individual with sufficient control over the situation to be 
able to wholly avoid the eventual outcome would thus not receive assistance, since the eventual 
outcome was ‘optional’. Bad ‘brute’ luck is compensated, whilst bad option luck is not. He put 
forwards the ‘Principle of Avoidable Blame’. In this Otsuka argued that ‘One is blameworthy for 
performing an act of a given type only if one could instead have behaved in a manner for which one 
would have been entirely blameless’ (Otsuka, 1998a, p. 250).Here then an individual can only be held 
accountable for her actions if she has adequate knowledge of the situation, and a reasonable 
opportunity to avoid it entirely. Such unavoidable actions should always be compensated for. In stark 
contrast to Vallentyne, Otsuka therefore supports compensating for all forms of brute luck. In this 
regard he offers a much more egalitarian solution.  
To return to the lightning example, this time using Otsuka’s redistributive framework.  The situation 
was unavoidable, given the sudden onset of the storm, and the lack of warning that the woman 
received. According to Otsuka she therefore could not reasonably have avoided the bad luck that 
beset her. Therefore it is just that society should assist her and ensures that she is able to return to 
an ‘equal opportunity for welfare’ with everyone else.  Otsuka’s redistribution of resources is 
therefore more egalitarian than Vallentyne’s. Rather than simply ensuring that individuals have an 
equal initial opportunity for welfare, Otsuka ensures that all unavoidable ‘brute’ luck events are 
compensated for. Although Otsuka’s dedication to an egalitarian distribution of resources is, he 
argues, just as strong as Dworkin or Cohen’s. The same cannot be said for Vallentyne.  
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Just as Vallentyne’s restrictions upon redistribution hinder the autonomy of individual self-owners, 
Otsuka’s ‘moderate luck egalitarianism’ ensures greater autonomy. As self-owners Individuals are 
allowed to make choices that negatively affect their property and wellbeing. This Involves ‘option 
luck’ which Otsuka follows Dworkin in allowing. However, since Otsuka ensures that no individual will 
be negatively affected by a situation that is bad ‘brute’ luck the autonomy of the individual can be 
maintained. By being compensated for ‘brute’ luck, individuals who are affected are able to maintain 
their autonomous ability to control their own lives. They can therefore ensure that their self-
ownership is more than ‘merely formal’.  Overall, in terms of the redistribution of resources Otsuka’s 
approach appears both more egalitarian and promotes individual autonomy to a greater degree. 
Peter Vallentyne justifies his movement away from brute luck egalitarianism by claiming that justice 
does not require it. However, from an egalitarian point of view the outcome of his ‘equality for initial 
opportunity’ is unacceptable. Furthermore, by looking at Cohen’s criticism of Nozick and the ‘merely 
formal’ self-ownership present Vallentyne’s argument can be seen to lack effective autonomy as well. 
Therefore in terms of offering an acceptable egalitarian solution, and also a solution that offers more 
than a formal self-ownership, Michael Otsuka’s redistribution is superior in terms of offering an 
equitable redistribution of resources that does not suffer from the sizeable flaws that plague 
Vallentyne. 
8 Conclusion  
I began this thesis by asking whether it was possible to ‘have your cake and eat it too’. First I set out 
Robert Nozick’s problems with such a reconciliation, then Cohen’s numerous critiques. This thesis has 
addressed the approaches to ‘having your cake and eat it too’ promoted by Peter Vallentyne and 
Michael Otsuka. The conclusion is that the best way in terms of self-ownership and equality, comes 
from Michael Otsuka, particularly within his Libertarianism without Inequality.  
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Peter Vallentyne and Michael Otsuka offer two very different conceptions of a reconciliation of self-
ownership and autonomy on the basis of an equal opportunity for welfare. Though Otsuka’s 
reconciliation is, I have argued, superior, there are a great many similarities between the two which 
have been necessarily overlooked for the purposes of this essay. It is important to accept that 
Vallentyne’s equal opportunity for welfare approach is similar in a great many ways to Michael 
Otsuka’s. That said, Otsuka’s approach offers greater individual autonomy via a more robust self-
ownership, and a more egalitarian approach.   
The differences between Michael Otsuka and Peter Vallentyne shown in this thesis are by no means 
an exhaustive list. Inevitably covering all differences between the two authors within this thesis 
would have been an impossibility. Instead, the key and consequential differences have been 
addressed here. These show that although, inevitably there are innumerable other differences 
between the two which it was not possible to cover, Otsuka particularly has a superior approach to 
reconciling the competing factors. 
I have examined self-ownership, world ownership, the egalitarian proviso, taxation and redistribution. 
In each instance, problems can be identified with Vallentyne’s approach. In each situation Michael 
Otsuka’s approach has better overcome those challenges. This is not to say that I have offered a 
complete defence of left-libertarianism. Instead I aim to have illustrated that Otsuka’s reconciliation 
is a viable option, and the most usable version of left-libertarianism yet produced. I also highlight 
how the standard critiques of left-libertarianism that apply to Vallentyne, Steiner et al, may not 
necessarily apply to Otsuka. Left-libertarianism still faces many questions from both right-libertarians 
and egalitarians alike. Barbara Freid’s claim that left-libertarianism is a meaningless exercise, that 
represents an egalitarian submission to right wing libertarians has hopefully been at least partially 
refuted in the process (Fried, 2004). This thesis demonstrates that left-libertarianism is a viable and 
workable field of inquiry. Otsuka in particular shows how self-ownership can be granted importance 
without devaluing egalitarianism, and that the self-ownership that arises is, if anything more 
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meaningful than that afforded to individuals by Robert Nozick. By following G.A. Cohen closely and 
building upon his work Otsuka has been able to avoid some of the problems that face Vallentyne, 
and which, as yet,  he has been unable to overcome adequately. In particular, Vallentyne faces many 
of the same problems with a ‘merely formal’ form of self-ownership for which Cohen criticizes Nozick 
and joint ownership left-libertarians.  
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